The fundamental requirement for providing medical care to detainees in U.S. custody is that they receive medical care consistent with the standard provided to U.S. 
DETAINEE HEALTH CARE: ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations. The United States and the international community cannot shy away from the difficult tasks of pursuing stabilization in conflict and post-conflict environments. In countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, building the capacity for security, economic growth, and good governance is the only path to long term peace and security.
-President Barack Obama 1 The United States involvement in stability operations stretches over 200 years. Rand report examined public health and health care delivery during nation-building and stability operations in Germany and Japan after World War II and in Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report concluded that delivery of medical care was an essential component of building stable democratic governments after conflicts. 5 In response to the lack of coordination among government agencies during contingency operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PPD) 56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations.
Although PPD 56 addressed the need to reform stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), internal bureaucratic resistance prevented effective implementation of PPD 56.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted further efforts to improve SRO planning, management, and oversight. 6 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24 emphasized the importance of strong and stable partners in the war on terror:
The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as effort to understand and address grievances that often lay at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves. 15 In a speech to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA), Secretary
Gates described future war as asymmetric conflicts that are similar to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 16 "The achievement of military objectives in such conflict is less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping the behavior of friends, adversaries and most-importantly-the people in between." 17 Interagency stability operations support Secretary Gates' objective of shaping behaviors through maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment; facilitating reconciliation with adversaries; establishing or rebuilding political, legal, social, and economic institutions to transition these responsibilities to a legitimate civil authority. 18 Because the greatest threat to U.S. national security comes from nations unable or unwilling to provide basic needs to their people the Army must restructure its training, its personnel policies, and its basic strategy to conduct stability operations in areas where unconventional war is being implemented.
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Failure to provide a safe and secure environment set the conditions for a return to fighting among warring factions in Iraq. The ensuring violent insurgency posed a significant threat to the safety and security of the local population. 20 Among the plethora of factors, which eventually led to the Iraq insurgency, the inability to stabilize the state and secure the populace was a contributing factor in the resurgence of violence. Efforts to quell the violence inevitably led to the detention of thousands of enemy combatants. 21 United States classification of these enemy combatants as detainees granted them their international legal rights under the Geneva Conventions.
Geneva Conventions
A Swiss banker, Henry J. Dunant horrified by the abandoned and untended wounded, the lack of medical supplies, and doctors he witnessed at the 1859 battle of A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, wants of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity. Another detention option allowed U.S. authorities to turn prisoners over to another entity, organization, or host nation authority. Since the Korean War, this became the preferred United States method. 35 During the Korean War, the South Koreans retained authority over prisoners. prohibited handing detention operations over to the Iraqis. 42 Soon after the occupation began, it became apparent that occupation forces were not designed or adequately manned to deal with the complex identification and numbers of captives. 43 The decision to house prisoners at Abu Ghraib revealed the extent of United
States improvisation to handle this problem. It is a violation of Geneva Convention III, Article 22, to house prisoners for any length of time in civil facilities. In addition, the decision highlighted the total lack by U.S. Commanders awareness of the reputation of Abu Ghraib under Hussein's regime. 44 Among Iraqis, Abu Ghraib was known as the most notorious prison in the country. Hundreds of Iraqi citizens were tortured, executed, and simply disappeared inside the walls of Abu Ghraib. 45 Located near the population center of Baghdad, Abu Ghraib was under frequent mortar and rocket-propelled grenade attacks. 52 Only effective leadership and discipline ensures Soldiers understand the principles of armed conflict and detainees' right s to humane treatment.
Violations of the principles of the law of armed conflict can result in a breakdown of troop discipline, command control, and force security; subject troops to reciprocal violations on the battlefield or in P.O.W. camps; and cause the defeat of an entire army in a guerrilla or other war through alignment of neutrals on the side of an enemy and hostile public opinion.
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The egregious abuses at Abu Ghraib violated principles of armed conflict. They provider interviewed reported a lack of proper medical equipment to treat older chronically ill detainees. 57 Physicians reported difficulties in transferring detainees requiring a higher echelon because of colleagues' resistance to accept detainee patients. 58 Many medical personnel stated their pre-deployment training for detention operations was inadequate. They admitted that they were unfamiliar with AR 190-8.
Regardless of these impediments, medical personnel at the detention facilities claimed they provided the same standard of medical care to detainees as they provided to Coalition Soldiers. 59 In response to the DAIG and U.S. Medical Command (MEDCOM) investigations,
Assistant Surgeon General for Force Projection, Colonel Philip Volpe issued Interim
Guidance on Detainee Medical Care. This document clearly stressed that the "overarching theme of this guidance is that all patients are equal and whenever possible, detainees should receive medical care equal to that of our own troops".
Volpe's guidance further directs that health care providers will not involve themselves in interrogation, will not advise interrogators on how to conduct interrogations, and will not provide medical data for the purpose of interrogation or intelligence gathering. As memories of abuse fade, memories of good treatment will be remembered. The Optometry Clinic provides comprehensive eye examinations and refractive care.
The Optometrist provides detainees with eyeglasses, eye medications, and referral for treatment of medical conditions and surgical care at other U.S. military facilities in Iraq.
Eye glasses proved especially important because they enable detainees to read the Koran.
Exhibiting a high rate of periodontal disease because of the lack of dental care prior to interment, detainees frequently require dental services. These services include extractions, fillings, radiological exams, and oral hygiene education. Remedial dental procedures dramatically improved the oral health of Iraqi detainees.
Because of their limited access to comprehensive health care prior to internment, detainees often required medication not authorized for the Coalition force in theater. For example some detainees required insulin, psychotherapeutic medications, and
Coumadin. In such cases, the Defense Medical Standardization Board (DMSB)
supports tailoring formularies to meet the needs of the detainee health care mission. to detainees projects a positive U.S. image and helps to win hearts and minds. It contributes to the effectiveness of other elements of stability operations. 72 The one variation, in providing detainees with care equal to that of coalition forces, is that Soldiers were evacuated out of theater for postoperative care, rehabilitation, and treatment of complicated medical problems. 73 The ultimate goal of stability operations is the transfer of reconstruction and stabilization activities to a legitimate functioning government. 74 Accordingly the host nation Ministry of Health (MoH) must eventually assume the health care of detainees.
This requires a functioning health care system and alignment of current detainee medical operations with the MoH capability without reducing the standard of care. This process begins with understanding Iraq health care capabilities and positively engaging with host-nation health care personnel.
Transfer of Detainee Medical Care
The Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for all aspects of the Iraqi health care
system. This includes the provision of care, oversight of policy, planning, and operation of health facilities, and the purchase, storage, and distribution of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment. 75 The MoH is responsible for delivering the same system. 80 The deteriorating security situation was the most significant challenge to reconstruction efforts. Healthcare specialists-including physicians, administrators, and information technologists-will train on the system together at the Al Muthana Hospital in Baghdad. Prior to OEF and OIF, the United States attempted to avoid detainee operations and not burden tactical commanders with this daunting task. 95 The vivid illustrations of the abuse and humiliation of detainees at Abu Ghraib will forever be a stain on the honor of the U.S military and a reminder of why detention operations can no longer be an afterthought. There is no doubt that this scandal damaged U.S. national security, fueled the Iraqi insurgency, and undermined efforts to bring peace to Iraq. 96 
